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State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #5867
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
CHRISTOPHER JOHN
)
OLEARAIN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43959
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-16115
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Christopher John Olearain pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol.
The district court sentenced him to ten years, with two years fixed. Mr. Olearain appeals
from the district court’s judgment of conviction, contending the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Olearain committed the crimes
of felony driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), in violation of I.C. §§ 18-8004,
-8005(9), and a misdemeanor for driving without privileges, in violation of I.C. § 18-
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8001. (R., pp.4–5.) At the time of the alleged offenses, Mr. Olearain had been on
probation for thirteen months for a prior felony DUI conviction. (Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSI”),1 p.8.) Mr. Olearain had served a retained jurisdiction (“a
rider”) in the Correctional Alternative Placement Program (“CAPP”) before he was
placed on probation. (PSI, p.8.)
In the instant case, Mr. Olearain waived a preliminary hearing, and the
magistrate bound him over to district court. (R., pp.13–15.) The State filed an
Information charging Mr. Olearain with DUI and driving without privileges. (R., pp.16–
17.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Olearain pled guilty to DUI, and the State
dismissed the misdemeanor charge. (Tr. Vol. I,2 p.5, L.5–p.6, L.6, p.13, L.3–p.14, L.20.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Olearain to ten years, with two years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.12, Ls.22–25.) Mr. Olearain filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s
Judgment and Commitment. (R., pp.37–39, 42–43.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten
years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Olearain, following his guilty plea to DUI?

Citations to the PSI refer to the 110-page electronic document containing the
confidential exhibits.
2 There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the entry of
plea hearing. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the sentencing hearing.
1

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Olearain, Following His Guilty Plea To DUI
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v.
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Olearain’s
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-8005(6), (9).
Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Olearain “must
show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3)
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho
122, 132 (2011).
Mr. Olearain asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends
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that the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment or
retained jurisdiction in light of the mitigating factors, including his need for treatment,
past success on probation, and family support.
Mr. Olearain’s alcohol abuse and need for treatment are strong factors in favor of
mitigation. A sentencing court should give “proper consideration of the defendant’s
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the
suggested alternatives for treating the problem.” State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).
Here, the GAIN Recommendation and Referral Summary diagnosed Mr. Olearain with
alcohol dependence. (PSI, p.25.) It recommended Level II.1 Intensive Outpatient
treatment. (PSI, p.31.) Mr. Olearain “finally after much denial accepted the fact that [he]
has an alcohol problem.” (PSI, p.110; see also PSI, pp.13–14.) He informed the district
court that he was “doing everything in [his] power” to get treatment. (PSI, p.110.) For
example, he signed up for the county jail’s Substance Abuse Program and wrote to
Ascent Behavioral Health regarding their outpatient treatment. (PSI, pp.14, 110.)
Similarly, Mr. Olearain explained at sentencing that he struggled with alcohol abuse and
actively was seeking out treatment. (Tr. Vol. II, p.10, Ls.9–22.)
Further, Mr. Olearain has shown a commitment to treatment with his past
success on the CAPP rider and probation. (PSI, p.8.) During the CAPP rider,
Mr. Olearain received no formal or informal disciplinary sanctions. (PSI, p.56.) He
completed the Moral Reconation Therapy (“MRT”) program and “internalized the
program material.” (PSI, pp.55–56, 58.) Then on probation, Mr. Olearain did not have
“any positive UAs or any issues or concerns.” (PSI, pp.8, 13.) He was completing his
monthly reports and fully paid his restitution. (PSI, p.8.) He also completed the MRT
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Aftercare Program and Men’s Relapse Prevention Aftercare Program. (PSI, p.8.)
Further, Mr. Olearain maintained a stable residence and steady employment. He lived in
his family home with his father and step-mother. (PSI, p.10.) His family was supportive.
(PSI, pp.9, 57, 73.) Mr. Olearain’s father reported that his family would help him in any
way, but would not “enable him.” (PSI, p.73; see also PSI, p.9.) Mr. Olearain worked for
Bogus Basin Ski Resort until the end of the season and then worked in the construction
field until the instant offense. (PSI, p.12.)
Mr. Olearain’s success on probation for thirteen months, despite his relapse,
demonstrates that he has the tools and family support to overcome his alcohol
addiction. In addition, he has fully acknowledged his alcohol problem and sought out
treatment. Based on these mitigating circumstances, Mr. Olearain asserts that the
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and declining to
retain jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Olearain respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district
court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 31st day of May, 2016.

___________/s/______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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